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(C7*) Therefore, q is not r-grainedly identical to pq, for some r. (C6, 8) 
 
Which is to say that phenomenal q stands in no identity relation to physical pq, at least at a certain 
level of grain r. And this is entirely consistent with the reductive physicalist who maintains that 
there is a real, underlying relation which the coarse-grained (C7*) fails to track: e.g., an s-grained 
identity, for s > r. 
 The brunt of the paper is occupied with a defense of the underlying semantic changes, the 
new premise (2*), and the plausibility of fine-grained reductive physicalism (in particular, fine-
grained phenomenal properties or states). In the first instance, I lean on existing views in modal 
semantics (Garson 2006) and the concept of “levels of abstraction” (Floridi 2011), to pin down a 
formal notion of “grain.” In the second instance, I lean on the representational theory of mind 
(Fodor 1975), introspective judgment, and empirical research favoring the limitations of 
conceivability and its cognates (Shepard & Metzler 1971; see also Nickerson & Adams 1979). 
Finally, in the third instance, I appeal to intuitions about the “homogeneity,” “spread-outness” 
(Robinson 2004), “non-gappiness,” or “intrinsicality” of phenomenal experience (see also 
Lockwood 2015), and the apparent existence of “phenomenal continua” (see Raffman 2012), to 
defend the plausibility of fine-grained phenomenal properties or states and their attendant 
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The aim of this article is to identify a characteristic of delusions: that which makes them 
pathological. It may appear a bit strange at first because one believes that delusions are just a 
pathological alteration of the mind. However, some authors have shown that although 
pathological delusions are the most studied, not all delusions have necessarily harmful 
consequences for the delirious subject or for others. Hence, it seems pertinent to question what 
makes delusions a pathological state. Although delusions are associated with several syndromes 
here I take mainly as a reference delusions that are related to the “Schizophrenia Spectrum and 
Other Psychotic Disorders” in the DSM 5 where they are described as “false beliefs”. Some 
authors think that delusions are in fact false beliefs and others that delusions are not beliefs but 
experiences. I also think that delusions are experiences and argue in favour of the Gallagher’s 
Multiple Realities (MR) model of delusions which is based on the phenomenology of Schütz.  
According to Schütz, everyday reality is not the only reality in which consciousness can be found. 
Developing an idea of William James, which states that in the Universe there are several "sub-
universes", Schütz maintains that there are several realities which he calls "finite provinces of 
sense", each having a different cognitive style, to which a specific tension of consciousness 
belongs, a specific epoché, a prevailing form of spontaneity, a specific form of self-experience, a 
specific form of socialization, and a specific perspective of time. Gallagher develops the idea of 
Schütz and includes delusions as a reality along with other alternative realties as dream, fiction 
or science. However, I think the MR model is not incompatible with the “belief model”   because 
beliefs could exist within the experience of delusional reality. After the exposition of the MR 
model I would try to explain why within this model one can understand that not all delusions are 
harmful for the subject or the others.  The subject can enter into a different reality – such as 
someone who is reading a novel and leaves the reality of the world around them – but this does 
not always have harmful consequences. Not because the subject ceases to carry the delusion into 
everyday reality, but because the content of this delusion could have positive consequences or at 
least not harmful consequences. In this way, one can explain, for example, some “mystical” 
delusions or some artistic creative delusions which seems not to have negative consequences even 
if there is confusion between everyday reality and delusion reality (according to MR model). 
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“Nothing in the world has ever been discovered (computers, simulations population with 
conscious beings…) as objects comparable to the abstract self. Nowadays, the self may be seen 
as the content of an “internal model of a transparent self" (Metzinger, 2009), relative to the body 
in the environment. Self in process, in all likelihood, and we will never find out whether or not 
we are simulations ourselves.  
However it is probably only a matter of time before we really create virtual beings inside 
computers. Super smart machines may be even conscious ones. 
It is widely accepted that our brain gives rise to consciousness, and the “I” is a by-product 
of consciousness itself. 
But the modern break in the mind-building was given when Hayek, approached Scotsman 
Hume, stated that "much of what we believe we know about the outside world is effectively a 
self-knowledge"(Hayek, 1952b, pp. 6-7). Without undoing conjectures, Hayek developed what 
we still do not understand well by physics or by philosophy (Bostrom, 2003): "How do I know I 
exist?" “You don’t now, because could someone - or something - else do it!”  
However the “I” experience comes from what source? Some clues come from neuropsychological 
condition such as Cotard’s syndrome: the brain has anomalies associated to the awareness of the 
body and its emotional state.  
There has never been an explanation for consciousness as for life, with evolutionary 
theories. Somewhere in the course of evolution, our brains became representing the world around 
us. Perhaps the feeling of self (the dust of the soul) is more important than its evolution. 
The philosopher Thomas Metzinger thinks that is a robust experience that comes to mind: 
“I exist”. The (illusory) experience is provided by the organ that makes us to imagine phenomenal 
selves, theories, love or paint. Are there only mental occurrences? With this illusion lived the 
idealistic Berkeley (1685-1753) who, with Kant (1724-1804), provided an odd form of existence 
to the mind and to mental phenomena ("It's all in your head."). For his part, Hume (1711-1776) 
did not want to startle and want to change our philosophies and scientific approaches. He merely 
forced the self to brush away the nonexistent, volatile forever, like a bundle of sensations. The 
impression faded from consciousness, like the pain caused by the "hot" burning iron. As with 
Hegel (1770-1831) one glimpses what some scientists claims to be self-consciousness: a distorted 
perception, a trick of the mind.  
How can physical networks of neurons produce experiences that appear to fall outside the 
material world? We propose to discuss consciousness as a mirage or an echo, and that hard 
problem of consciousness completely disappears in its entirety. But if reality is real it relies on 
the minds and consciousnesses of observers, with very skilled brains at representing possibly 
objects as having immaterial properties (the mirage of consciousness) even extended to stars and 
black holes. All is said by an observer who is not neutral.  
